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SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Does Sexual HarassmentRequire Proofof PsychologicalInjury?
by Barbara J. Fick

Teresa Harris
V.

Forklift Systems, Inc.
(Docket No. 92-1168)
Argument Date: October 13, 1993

ISSUE
Is a plaintiff required to prove that he or she suffered psychological injury as a result of sexual harassment in the workplace in
order to prove a hostile-environment, sexual harassment case
under Title VII?

also remarked that the company needed "a man as the rental
manager" and suggested to Harris that they go to the Holiday
Inn to negotiate her raise. The magistrate also found that Hardy
made sexually suggestive comments about the clothing wom
by Harris and other female employees, and commented on
aspects of their anatomy. The magistrate further found that
Hardy asked Harris and other female employees to retrieve
coins from his front pants pocket and threw objects on the
ground in front of female employees and asked them to pick up
the objects, making comments about their clothing.
Having found that Hardy engaged in this conduct, the magistrate, nonetheless, concluded that it was not so severe as to
create a hostile work environment. In reaching this result, the
magistrate relied on the test set forth

Case at a Glance

by the Sixth Circuit in Rabidue v.

FACTS
Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611
Teresa Harris was employed as a
(6th Cir. 1986), for determining
itle VII of
rental manager by Forklift Systems, Inc.
the Civil Rights Act
when sexual harassment rises to the
("Forklift") at its office in Nashville,
level of a hostile work environment.
of 1964 pro'hibits sexual harassTennessee. Her immediate supervisor
The Rabidue court held that a hosment when 1) it is made a term
was Charles Hardy, the president of the
environment is created where
tile
creit
2)
or
or condition of emp loyment
company. During her tenure with the
conduct "would interharassing
the
ates an abusive or hostile work environcompany, Hardy made sexually derogahypothetical reasonthat
with
fere
ment. Where sex ual harassment is a
tory and demeaning remarks to Hams as
able individual's work performance
condition of emplo)yment, the plaintiff
and affect the psychological wellwell as to other female employees. When
alleges
a
tangible
in
ljuryfor
example,
being of that reasonable person."
Harris eventually complained to Hardy
being fired for refus ing to date his or her
In applying this test to the facts of
about his comments, he apologized, said
boss. This case pre sents the question of
Harris' case, the magistrate conhe was only joking, and promised that he
whether a plaintiffclaiming that sexual
cluded that Hardy's conduct
would no longer make such remarks.
A few weeks later, however, Hardy
harassment created a hostile work enviwould not have interfered with a
resumed his offensive behavior which
ronment must allegge that the harassing
reasonable person's work perforincluded a remark that Harris used sex to
mance and that Harris did not sufconduct caused a taangible injury - for
land an account. Several weeks later,
fer any psychological injury as a
example, psychologgical harm.
Harris quit.
result of Hardy's harassment.
Harris subsequently filed a lawsuit
Following Rabidue, the magistrate
alleging that Forklift had violated Title VII by, among other
dismissed the hostile-environment, sexual harassment claim.
The magistrate also concluded that, because Harris was not
things, creating a sexually hostile working environment and
that the environment was so bad that she was constructively dissubjected to a hostile environment, she was not constructively
charged, i.e., forced to quit. A hearing was held before a federdischarged because of the Hardy's actions. Accordingly, the
al magistrate who found that Hardy had indeed engaged in a
magistrate dismissed Harris' constructive- discharge claim.
continuing pattern of sex- based derogatory conduct.
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
The magistrate specifically found that, in the presence of
Tennessee adopted the magistrate's report in an unpublished
other employees, Hardy said to Harris, "You're a woman, what
opinion, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The
do you know" and called Harris "a dumb ass woman." Hardy
Supreme Court granted Harris' petition for writ of certiorari to
decide the question whether proof of psychological injury is a
Barbara J. Fick is associate professor law at Notre Dame Law
necessary element in a hostile-environment, sexual harassment
School, Notre Dame, IN 46556; telephone (219) 631-5864.
case.
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BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986), recognized a cause of action under Title VII
where sexual harassment creates a hostile work environment.
The Court held that a hostile environment is created when
harassing conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment.
In focusing on the issue of when harassing conduct is sufficiently severe to alter employment conditions, the lower courts
have developed two tests: 1) did the conduct interfere with the
plaintiff's work performance when viewed from the perspective
of a reasonable employee in the plaintiff's position; and 2) did
the conduct cause psychological injury to the plaintiff. The Ninth
Circuit applies the first test, while the Third and Eleventh
Circuits apply the second. Other courts find a violation of Title
VII if either test is satisfied. The Sixth Circuit, however,
requires a plaintiff to meet both tests. The Supreme Court will
decide if proof of psychological harm is a necessary predicate
to finding thatsexually harassing conduct altered employment
conditions.
Mandating a requirement of proof of psychological injury
could adversely affect plaintiffs in several ways. Whenever a
court imposes an additional proof factor on a party, it makes
the case that much more difficult for the party to win. This
effect is exacerbated in sexual harassment cases, where studies have shown that only a small percentage of sexually
harassing behavior is even reported to begin with.
Requiring proof of psychological injury could deter individuals from bringing valid harassment claims because of an
unwillingness to portray themselves as mentally impaired.
Were the Court to impose a psychological-injury requirement,
a plaintiff's mental condition would be a fact "in controversy"
and the defendant, as a matter of course, would seek an order
requiring the plaintiff to undergo a psychological examination
as part of pre-trial discovery. Such a forced psychological
examination, with the results available to defendant, would
serve as an additional deterrent to plaintiffs in these cases.
None of the parties before the Court in this case - neither
Ms. Harris, Forklift, nor the many amici - advocate that the
Court adopt the Sixth Circuit's position, thereby imposing a
psychological-harm test in hostile-environment cases. All take
the position that, while proof of psychological injury may be
sufficient to prove a hostile-environment claim, it is not necessary. All parties agree that proof that the harassing conduct
altered plaintiff's working conditions, when viewed from the
objective position of the reasonable employee in plaintiff's
position, is sufficient to establish a hostile environment claim.
It appears unlikely, therefore, that the Supreme Court would
adopt the Sixth Circuit's view and require proof of psychological injury.
The parties, however, join issue, on whether or not
Hardy's conduct would have interfered with the work performance of a reasonable employee in Harris' position.
Accordingly, the Court is asked to determine whether or not
the magistrate applied the correct test to the facts of Harris'
case in light of its decision in Meritor.

Issue No. ]Q
I

ARGUMENTS
For Teresa Harris (Counsel of Record: Irwin Venick; Woods
& Venick, 121 17th Avenue, South, Nashville, TN 37203, telephone (615) 259-4366):
1. Proof of serious psychological injury is not necessary to
establish hostile-environment liability on the basis of sex
under Title VII.
2. Neither Harris' hostile-environment claim nor her constructive-discharge claim should have been dismissed.
For Forklift Systems, Inc. (Counsel of Record: Stanley M.
Chernau; Chernau, Milam & Weiss, 3rd National Financial
Center, 424 Church Street, 13th Floor, Nashville, TN 37129,
telephone (615) 244-5480):
1. Sexual harassment is actionable only where there is a
demonstrable effect on the victim's working conditions
evaluated from the objective standpoint of a reasonable person in the victim's position.
2. The magistrate applied the correct test in this case and properly concluded that the work performance of a reasonable
person in Harris' position would not have been affected by
Hardy's conduct.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Teresa Harris
Joint brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the
American Jewish Congress (Counsel of Record: Steven R.
Shapiro;American Civil Liberties Union Foundation,132 West
43 Street New York, NY 10036, telephone (212) 944-9800);
Joint brief of the Employment Law Center, the California
Women's Law Center, and Equal Rights Advocates, Inc.
(Counselof Record: PatriciaA. Shiu; Employment Law Center,
1663 Mission Street, Suite 400, San Francisco,CA 94103, telephone (415) 864- 8848);
Feminists for Free Expression (CounselofRecord: Cathy E.
Crosson; 406 South Eastside Drive, Bloomington, IN 47401,
telephone (812) 855-2596);
Joint brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc. and the National Council of Jewish Women
(Counsel of Record: Eric Schnapper; NAACP Legal Defense
andEducationalFund,Inc., 99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor,New
York, NY 10013, telephone (212) 219-1900);
Joint brief of the National Conference of Womens' Bar
Associations and Women's Bar Association of the District of
Columbia (Counsel of Record: Edith Barnett; 11104 Post
House Court, Potomac, MD 20854, telephone (301) 9830230);
National Employment Lawyers Association (Counsel of
Record: MargaretA. Harris;3223 Smith, Suite 308, Houston,
TX 77006, telephone (713) 526-5677):
Joint brief of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
and 13 others (Counsel of Record: Deborah A. Ellis; NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund, 99 Hudson Street, New
York NY 10013, telephone (212) 925-6635);

Joint brief of the Southern States Police Benevolent
Association and the North Carolina Police Benevolent
Association (Counsel of Record: J. Michael McGuinness;
McGuinness & Parlagreco,P.O. Box 8035, Salem, MA 01971,
telephone (508) 741- 8051);
The United States of America (William C. Bryson, Acting
Solicitor General; Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20530, telephone (202)514-2217;
Joint brief of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, the
National Women's Law Center, and 24 others (Counsel of
Record: Carolyn F. Corwin; Covington & Burling, 1201
PennsylvaniaAvenue, N.W., Washington,DC 20044, telephone
(202) 662-6000).

In Support of Forklift Systems, Inc.
The Equal Employment Advisory Council (Counsel of
Record: Ann Elizabeth Reesman; McGuiness & Williams, 1015
Fifteenth Street,N.W., Suite 1200, Washington, DC 20005, telephone: (202) 789-8600).
In Support of NeitherParty
Brief of the American Psychological Association (Counsel
of Record: Dort S. Bigg; American PsychologicalAssociation,
750 FirstStreet, N.E., Washington, DC 20002, telephone (202)
336-6080).
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